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IRREPARABLE MISIDENTIFICATIONS AND RELIABILITY:
REASSESSING THE THRESHOLD FOR ADMISSIBILITY
OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION
JULES EPSTEIN*
Identification evidence is “significant evidence [but] . . . still
only evidence, and . . . not a factor that goes to the very
heart—the ‘integrity’—of the adversary process.”1
Substantial research confirms that “people do not perform
well at distinguishing between accurate and
inaccurate identifications.”2
FOR forty years it has been settled, as a matter of federal constitutionallaw applying Due Process principles and protection,3 that identifica-
tions following a suggestive, police-conducted procedure—be it a showup,
a lineup, a photo display—shall be admitted as trial evidence notwith-
standing any suggestivity as long as the resulting “that’s the guy” is relia-
ble.4  As the Court set forth in Neil v. Biggers,5 “the central question [is]
whether under the totality of the circumstances the identification was reli-
able even though the confrontation procedure was suggestive.”6  The ulti-
mate measure of reliability was that the identification had to be sufficient
to ensure that there was not “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable
* Associate Professor of Law, Widener University School of Law (Delaware).
Thanks are due to eyewitness law and strategy expert James Doyle for his initial
guidance in analyzing the reliability standard for eyewitness evidence; to
Connecticut eyewitness evidence litigator and scholar Lisa Steele and Widener
colleague Professor Leonard Sosnov for their critical insights and guidance; and to
research librarian Janet Lindenmuth for inestimable assistance.  This Article was
made possible by a summer research grant awarded by the Law School, for which
Professor Epstein expresses his gratitude.
1. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.14 (1977) (citation omitted); see
also Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981).
2. DAN SIMON, IN DOUBT: THE PSYCHOLOGY OF THE CRIMINAL JUSTICE PROCESS
151 (2012).
3. For a further discussion of states that have implemented more expansive
protections, see infra notes 72–87 and accompanying text.
4. The precondition of a suggestive procedure to trigger Due Process con-
cerns is largely accepted as necessary to trigger a Due Process analysis. See, e.g.,
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 878 (N.J. 2011) (requiring pre-trial hearings to
challenge identification testimony admissibility only upon initial showing of sug-
gestivity); State v. Outing, 3 A.3d 1, 14 (Conn. 2010) (holding that without proof
of unnecessarily suggestive identification procedure, suppression court need make
no further inquiry into identification reliability).
5. 409 U.S. 188, 199 (1972).
6. Id. (quotation omitted).
(69)
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misidentification.”7  This standard, seemingly de minimis, was reaffirmed by
the Court in 2012 and limited in its enforceability to only those identifica-
tion procedures arranged by state actors.8
Much has been written about how reliability is to be assessed—
whether the five factors set forth in Manson v. Brathwaite9 and Biggers are
scientific and sufficient,10 and whether there is actual independence be-
tween suggestivity and reliability or whether the former, at times, impacts
and distorts the latter.11  Yet what has generated minimal discussion subse-
quent to Manson and Biggers is how reliable the proof must be, whatever
measures are used for that test.  More particularly, few cases discuss
whether a finding of reliability equates with accuracy and correctness, or
instead need show only a possibility that the identification is the result of
personal knowledge rather than derivative of police suggestiveness, akin to
the authentication threshold of whether a jury could possibly find that the
item is what it purports to be.12
That the lesser threshold is what the Court intended in Manson and
Biggers cannot be doubted.  The Court described the issue as an “eviden-
tiary interest” and proclaimed that only at the extremes would eyewitness
evidence be inadmissible:
[W]e cannot say that under all the circumstances of this case
there is “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentifica-
tion.”  Short of that point, such evidence is for the jury to weigh.
We are content to rely upon the good sense and judgment of
American juries, for evidence with some element of untrustwor-
thiness is customary grist for the jury mill.  Juries are not so sus-
ceptible that they cannot measure intelligently the weight of
identification testimony that has some questionable feature.13
7. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
8. See Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
9. 432 U.S. 98 (1977).
10. For a discussion of whether the factors set forth in Manson and Biggers are
scientific and sufficient, see infra notes 72–104 and accompanying text.
11. By way of illustration, police feedback at a showup or line-up identifica-
tion may “inflate” an eyewitness’s recollection of the length of the event and the
attention paid, thereby artificially altering the reliability considerations. See, e.g.,
Gertrud Hafstad, Amina Memon, & Robert Logie, Post-identification Feedback, Confi-
dence and Recollections of Witnessing Conditions in Child Witnesses, 18 APPL. COGNIT.
PSYCHOL. 901, 901–912 (2004); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, Distortions in
Eyewitnesses’ Recollections: Can the Postidentification-Feedback Effect Be Moderated?, 10(2)
PSYCHOL. SCI. 138, 138–144 (1999); Gary L. Wells & Amy L. Bradfield, “Good, You
Identified the Suspect”: Feedback to Eyewitnesses Distorts Their Reports of the Witnessing
Experience, 83(3) J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 360, 360–376 (1998).
12. See FED. R. EVID. 901(a) (providing that “[t]o satisfy the requirement of
authenticating or identifying an item of evidence, the proponent must produce
evidence sufficient to support a finding that the item is what the proponent claims
it is”).
13. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116 (citation omitted).
2
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 3 21-FEB-13 10:11
2013] ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 71
This satisfied Due Process, which requires only a modicum of potential reli-
ability for the evidence to be admissible for jury scrutiny, with cross-exami-
nation, contrary proof, or jury instructions providing sufficient tools for
testing and evaluation.14 Perry v. New Hampshire15 restated this with em-
phasis, holding that Due Process restricts admissibility “[o]nly when evi-
dence is so extremely unfair that its admission violates fundamental
conceptions of justice . . . .”16  Said otherwise, the direction to suppression
courts is not to conclude that an identification is actually reliable in terms
of being correct, but that there is a basis by which a jury that heard that
identification testimony could weigh it intelligently through the adversary
trial process and conclude that it was in fact accurate.
What warrants examination is the linkage of evidentiary admissibility
(“evidentiary interest”) to the risk of “substantial likelihood of irreparable
misidentification.”  The Court’s premise was that the adversary process
would, in all but the most exceptional cases, “correct” for any error in a
witness’s claim of identification, describing eyewitness testimony in a post-
Biggers holding as “significant evidence [but] . . . still only evidence,
and . . . not a factor that goes to the very heart—the ‘integrity’—of the
adversary process.”17  The process due was the adversary trial with its guar-
antee of cross-examination18 which would permit the “intelligent[ ]”
weighing of the evidence envisioned by the Manson Court.19
History has proved otherwise.  Cross-examination, even vigorous,
skilled cross-examination, has not been curative for mistaken eyewitness
testimony,20 a fact borne out persuasively by more than 260 DNA exonera-
tions.21  If that is the case, and if Due Process mandates some assurance
that irreparable misidentification does not occur, then the Due Process
reliability threshold must be increased or redesigned from that of mere
“evidentiary interest.”
14. Id. at 113 (“Biggers . . . did not . . . establish a strict exclusionary rule or
new standard of due process.  Judge Leventhal . . . correctly has described Stovall as
protecting an evidentiary interest and, at the same time, as recognizing the limited
extent of that interest in our adversary system.” (citation omitted)).
15. 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
16. Id. at 723 (citation omitted).
17. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981) (quoting Manson, 432 U.S.
at 113 n.14).
18. Id. at 349 (“[U]nder our adversary system of justice, cross-examination has
always been considered a most effective way to ascertain truth.”).
19. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.  For a discussion of the ways in which the adver-
sary process satisfies Due Process, see supra note 14 and accompanying text.
20. See Jules Epstein, The Great Engine that Couldn’t: Science, Mistaken Identifica-
tions, and the Limits of Cross-Examination, 36 STETSON L. REV. 727, 727–88 (2007).
21. See BRANDON L. GARRETT, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 45 (Harvard Univ.
Press 2011); Eyewitness Misidentification, http://www.innocenceproject.org/under
stand/Eyewitness-Misidentification.php (last visited Oct. 9, 2012) (“Eyewitness mis-
identification is the single greatest cause of wrongful convictions nationwide, play-
ing a role in nearly [seventy-five percent] of convictions overturned through DNA
testing.”).
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This Article commences with an overview of reliability decisional law,
and continues in Section II with a critical assessment that deems the stan-
dard “threadbare” and surveys criticisms of it as a-scientific.  Section III
surveys Due Process jurisprudence concerning the admission of evidence
in cases other than eyewitness identification-based prosecutions, and iden-
tifies core components of a constitutional threshold for evidentiary relia-
bility.  Section IV explains why traditional trial safeguards have proved
inadequate in eyewitness cases.  Section V concludes with a proposal for a
reformulated Due Process approach to eyewitness evidence—one that sets
a “sliding scale” for admissibility with the stringency of the reliability deter-
mination dependent upon the availability and quality of trial safeguards
other than cross-examination, such as improved jury instructions and the
utilization of expert testimony, to ensure against what the Court pur-
ported to address in its reliability decisions: irreparable misidentifications.
I. TOWARD A RELIABILITY STANDARD
The Court’s jurisprudence on eyewitness identification began not
with Due Process concerns but with instances of the outright, unequivocal
denial of a constitutional protection: the presence of counsel at post-in-
dictment lineups.22  But acknowledgment of the potential limitations of
eyewitness testimony came even earlier when, in a decision involving a
prosecutor’s knowing presentation of false testimony (the claim that no
promise had been made to a cooperating witness), the Court emphasized
that “the passage of time and the dim light in the cocktail lounge made
eyewitness identification very difficult and uncertain . . . .”23
This was followed in 1967 by the commencement of the constitution-
alization of aspects of the identification process.  In companion cases, Gil-
bert v. California24 and United States v. Wade,25 the Court determined that a
post-indictment lineup was a critical stage of a criminal prosecution and
that where it occurred “without notice to and in the absence of the ac-
cused’s appointed counsel[,]” a resulting out-of-court identification would
be automatically excluded, regardless of the reliability of the resulting
identification.26
It was not that reliability concerns did not influence the Court’s analy-
sis.  To the contrary, what made counsel’s presence essential was the risk
of error, one captured in the oft-repeated pronouncement that “[t]he va-
garies of eyewitness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal
22. For a discussion of the right to counsel at post-indictment lineups, see
infra notes 23–29 and accompanying text.
23. Napue v. Illinois, 360 U.S. 264, 266 (1959).
24. 388 U.S. 263 (1967).
25. 388 U.S. 218 (1967).
26. Id. at 223, 239–43. See Stovall v. Denno, 388 U.S. 293, 299 (1967)
(“[W]hile we feel that the exclusionary rules set forth in Wade and Gilbert are justi-
fied by the need to assure the integrity and reliability of our system of justice, they
undoubtedly will affect cases in which no unfairness will be present.”).
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law are rife with instances of mistaken identification.”27  Yet the remedy
was not dependent on the unreliability of the particular lineup identifica-
tion; rather, it emerged as a bright-line rule of exclusion.28  The same was
subsequently applied to out-of-court identifications that are “fruits” of a
Fourth Amendment violation.29
Of particular relevance to this Article is the Court’s test for determin-
ing whether an in-court, time-of-trial identification would be permitted fol-
lowing an out-of-court identification that violated the Sixth Amendment.
Rather than address “evidentiary interests,” the focus of the Court’s analy-
sis in the subsequent Due Process cases,30 the denial of counsel cases,
mandated a prosecution showing of actual independent source:
[T]he proper test to be applied in these situations is . . .
[w]hether, granting establishment of the primary illegality, the
evidence to which instant objection is made has been come at by
exploitation of that illegality or instead by means sufficiently dis-
tinguishable to be purged of the primary taint.  Application of
this test in the present context requires consideration of various
factors; for example, the prior opportunity to observe the alleged
criminal act, the existence of any discrepancy between any pre-
lineup description and the defendant’s actual description, any
identification prior to lineup of another person, the identifica-
tion by picture of the defendant prior to the lineup, failure to
identify the defendant on a prior occasion, and the lapse of time
between the alleged act and the lineup identification.  It is also
relevant to consider those facts which, despite the absence of
counsel, are disclosed concerning the conduct of the lineup.31
This judicial factual determination, because it is measured at the level of
clear and convincing evidence, is a far cry from that in a Due Process
inquiry.32
In Stovall v. Denno,33 there was again a claim of the denial of counsel,
as Stovall had been subjected to a post-arraignment uncounseled identifi-
cation procedure: a hospital showup.  Because his case was on collateral
27. Wade, 388 U.S. at 228.
28. See Gilbert, 388 U.S. at 273 (“Only a per se exclusionary rule as to such
testimony can be an effective sanction to assure that law enforcement authorities
will respect the accused’s constitutional right to the presence of his counsel at the
critical lineup.”).
29. United States v. Crews, 445 U.S. 463 (1980).
30. For a discussion of Due Process rights regarding identification proce-
dures, see infra notes 33–66 and accompanying text.
31. Wade, 388 U.S. at 241 (quotation and citation omitted).
32. Id. at 240 (“We do not think this disposition can be justified without first
giving the Government the opportunity to establish by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the in-court identifications were based upon observations of the suspect
other than the lineup identification.”).
33. 388 U.S. 293 (1967).
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review rather than direct appeal, he was not entitled to retroactive applica-
tion of the Wade/Gilbert protection, which was held to apply only prospec-
tively.34  Lacking the protection of the Sixth Amendment, the Court
nonetheless recognized a separate right to Due Process in the identifica-
tion procedure utilized.
The Court found this right supported by but one prior holding, that
of the Fourth Circuit in Palmer v. Peyton.35  There, a voice identification
was deemed to have been secured in violation of Due Process because the
“opportunity for suggestion inherent in the procedure used . . . [was]
manifest.”36  The witness was advised that the police had a suspect, was
shown a shirt that matched the color of that worn by the perpetrator, and
after having previously had to attend a voice lineup involving several peo-
ple, was this time in a one-person voice demonstration.37  The Court of
Appeals described this as having “destroyed the possibility of an objective,
impartial judgment by the prosecutrix as to whether Palmer’s voice was in
fact that of the man who had attacked her.”38
Yet the Stovall Court cited none of this language, instead adopting it
only implicitly but then modifying it in two critical fashions: 1) focusing
the inquiry on whether it was “imperative” that the procedure take place,
and 2) a consequent evaluation of whether Due Process was violated in
light of the totality of the circumstances.39  The suggestivity of a one-per-
son showup was but one factor, albeit one recognized as being a practice
“widely condemned.”40  At the same time, “totality” remained undefined,
but there was no apparent reference to consideration of circumstances
extrinsic to the challenged identification process itself.41  Stovall himself
was denied relief, as the hospitalization of the crime victim rendered “im-
perative” the prompt, in-handcuffs showup.42
What came next in the application of the Due Process guarantee to
eyewitness identification was an approval of pre-arrest photo identifica-
tions, even when conducted suggestively.  In Simmons v. United States,43 po-
34. Id. at 297–99.
35. 359 F.2d 199 (4th Cir. 1966).
36. Id. at 201.
37. Id.
38. Id. at 202.
39. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
40. Id.
41. See Steven P. Grossman, Suggestive Identifications: The Supreme Court’s Due
Process Test Fails to Meet Its Own Criteria, 11 U. BALT. L. REV. 53, 55 (1981); Yale
Kamisar, The Warren Court and Criminal Justice: A Quarter-Century Retrospective, 31
TULSA L.J. 1, 29–30 (1995) (“This is an elusive, unpredictable case-by-case test that,
as might be expected, has not turned out to be any more manageable for the
courts or any more illuminating for law enforcement officers than the pre-Miranda
‘totality of the circumstances’-‘voluntariness’ test.”).
42. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
43. 390 U.S. 377 (1968).
6
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lice showed multiple photographs of Simmons to witnesses to a robbery.44
The Court held that before identification testimony would be disallowed
at trial, it would have to be shown that the identification process “was so
impermissibly suggestive as to give rise to a very substantial likelihood of
irreparable misidentification.”45  What made Simmons significant were sev-
eral changes to, or elaborations on, the Stovall standard.
First, Stovall forbade “unnecessarily suggestive” practices;46 a thresh-
old raised to “impermissibly suggestive” in Simmons.47  Second, Simmons
raised the bar to require “a very substantial likelihood of irreparable mis-
identification”48 from Stovall’s lower requirement of a risk “conducive to
irreparable mistaken identification.”49  Finally, the Simmons majority made
clear that factors extrinsic to the identification process—specifically, the
circumstances of the crime and the opportunity to observe the perpetra-
tor(s)—were appropriate considerations in the Due Process totality
analysis.50
One last point warrants emphasis.  Essential to the Court’s setting of a
Due Process standard was its conclusion that cross-examination at trial
could offset any erroneous identification resulting from suggestivity: “The
danger that use of the technique may result in convictions based on mis-
identification may be substantially lessened by a course of cross-examina-
tion at trial which exposes to the jury the method’s potential for error.”51
Two remaining decisions completed the initial delineation of the Due
Process standard.  In Biggers the Court first made clear that the Simmons
standard of impermissible suggestivity leading to “a very substantial likeli-
hood of irreparable misidentification[,]” designed for in-court identifica-
tions, applied equally to the admissibility of out-of-court identifications
“with the deletion of ‘irreparable.’”52  What the Court seemed to be saying
is that trial tools, particularly cross-examination, offered some opportunity
for “repair” after a suggestive identification.  The Court then diminished
the “unnecessarily suggestive” standard announced in Stovall, explaining
that even when better (less suggestive) options were available to police,
44. Id. at 380–81.
45. Id. at 384.
46. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
47. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 384.
48. Id.
49. Stovall, 388 U.S. at 302.
50. Simmons, 390 U.S. at 385.  The Court noted:
[T]here was in the circumstances of this case little chance that the proce-
dure utilized led to misidentification of Simmons. The robbery took place
in the afternoon in a well-lighted bank. The robbers wore no masks. Five
bank employees had been able to see the robber later identified as Sim-
mons for periods ranging up to five minutes. Those witnesses were shown
the photographs only a day later, while their memories were still fresh.
Id.
51. Id. at 384.
52. Neil v. Biggers, 409 U.S. 188, 198 (1972).
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the resort to an “unnecessarily suggestive” one would not, without more,
establish a Due Process violation.53
Finally, and for the first time, the Court identified those factors to be
considered in its “totality” assessment:
• the opportunity of the witness to view the criminal at the time of
the crime,
• the witness’s degree of attention,
• the accuracy of his prior description of the criminal,
• the level of certainty demonstrated by the witness at the confronta-
tion, and
• the length of time between the crime and the confrontation.54
The Court made one final ruling in its 1960s-1970s Due Process cases,
holding in Manson that the Biggers factors applied even to cases that post-
dated Stovall.55  For the Court there was a single determinant in all identi-
fication cases—“reliability is the linchpin in determining the admissibility
of identification testimony . . . .”56  Despite the dissent’s emphasis on “the
unusual threat to the truth-seeking process posed by the frequent untrust-
worthiness of eyewitness identification,”57 the Court had constructed only
a limited barrier to admitting eyewitness testimony.
Any question about the validity and endurance of the Biggers test was
laid to rest by the Court in 2012 in Perry.58  Ostensibly limited to deciding
whether the Biggers test applied when the arguably suggestive procedure
was not arranged by state actors,59 there was anticipation that the Court
would re-examine Biggers in light of the nearly forty years of science and
lessons from exonerations—points urged by various amici.60
53. Id. at 199.
54. Id. at 199–200.
55. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 114 (1977).
56. Id. (holding Biggers factors are to be applied and “[a]gainst these factors is
to be weighed the corrupting effect of the suggestive identification itself”).
57. Id. at 119 (Marshall, J., dissenting).
58. Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012).
59. See id. at 723 (“We granted certiorari to resolve a division of opinion on
the question whether the Due Process Clause requires a trial judge to conduct a
preliminary assessment of the reliability of an eyewitness identification made
under suggestive circumstances not arranged by the police.”).
60. See, e.g., Brief for American Psychological Association as Amici Curiae Sup-
porting Petitioner, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132 S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974),
2011 WL 3488994, at *2–3 (urging Court to “take account of extensive psychologi-
cal research, much of it conducted since 1977, which shows that the presence or
absence of state action in creating any suggestiveness is frequently irrelevant to the
primary evil to be avoided, i.e., the likelihood of . . . misidentification”) (quotation
omitted); Brief for Wilton Dedge, Herman Atkins, Jennifer Thompson, and Mi-
chele Mallin as Amici Curiae Supporting Petitioner, Perry v. New Hampshire, 132
S. Ct. 716 (2012) (No. 10-8974), 2011 WL 3584756, at *3  (“Three decades of ro-
bust scientific research has abundantly demonstrated . . . [that] suggestive circum-
stances, whatever their source, can produce unreliable eyewitness identifications
8
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The contrary proved to be the case.  The Perry majority, in the course
of restricting the Due Process protection in eyewitness cases to instances in
which there was “the taint of improper state conduct[,]”61 emphatically
restated the minimal threshold of reliability.62  There was no explicit men-
tion of the “evidentiary interest” language of Manson, but the Court made
its vitality clear by linking it to “[t]he Constitution . . . protect[ing] a de-
fendant against a conviction based on evidence of questionable reliability,
not by prohibiting introduction of the evidence, but by affording the de-
fendant means to persuade the jury that the evidence should be dis-
counted as unworthy of credit.”63  For the Perry majority, reliability is a
constitutional issue only when police arranged a suggestive initial identifi-
cation;64 and in those instances it remains an easily surmounted barrier, a
“good enough for jury consideration” test.
Nonetheless, Perry lends support to a somewhat invigorated Due Pro-
cess analysis, as key to that holding was the perception that the process
due an accused was found in the varying protections available at trial, be
they rights available in every trial—a jury as factfinder, the benefit of cross-
examination, the provision of effective representation, and the beyond a
reasonable doubt standard65—and some state-created protections particu-
lar to eyewitness cases, especially targeted jury instructions and, in some
that pose serious and unique threats to the fairness and integrity of a criminal trial,
and cause a substantial likelihood of misidentification and wrongful conviction.”).
61. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
62. Id. at 724–25.  It is arguable that the Perry majority did acknowledge that
the Biggers factors might not comport with science, as the Court described them as
“among” the considerations in a reliability assessment, rather than as a finite list.
Id. at 725 n.5.
63. Id. at 723.  The dissent made clear that the interest was “evidentiary.” Id.
at 733 (Sotomayor, J., dissenting).
64. Partly motivating the Court in its decision to limit Due Process claims to
cases involving state action was fear of a veritable Pandora’s box, one where virtu-
ally every identification could be challenged as a constitutional violation:
There is no reason why an identification made by an eyewitness with poor
vision, for example, or one who harbors a grudge against the defendant,
should be regarded as inherently more reliable, less of a “threat to the
fairness of trial,” than the identification Blandon made in this case.  To
embrace Perry’s view would thus entail a vast enlargement of the reach of
due process as a constraint on the admission of evidence.
Id. at 727.  While beyond the focus of this Article, the perceived need to link Due
Process to police-induced suggestivity is incompatible with holdings in areas as di-
verse as victim impact evidence in death penalty cases and challenges to non-testi-
monial hearsay where the Due Process protection applies to unreliable or
inflammatory evidence without regard to state action. See, e.g., Michigan v. Bryant,
131 S. Ct. 1143, 1162 n.13 (2011) (acknowledging that non-testimonial hearsay,
albeit outside reach of Confrontation Clause, may be excluded due to unreliability
on Due Process grounds); Payne v. Tennessee, 501 U.S. 808, 831 (1991) (“If, in a
particular case, a witness’[s] testimony or a prosecutor’s remark so infects the sen-
tencing proceeding as to render it fundamentally unfair, the defendant may seek
appropriate relief under the Due Process Clause of the Fourteenth Amendment.”).
65. Perry, 132 S. Ct. at 728.
9
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cases, expert witness testimony.66  The Court did not mandate either of
the latter, but its including them as factors pertinent to whether Due Pro-
cess protections would suffice lends support to this Article’s thesis—that
the admissibility determination for eyewitness evidence is inextricably
linked to whether a trial can ensure against or substantially prevent “a very
substantial likelihood of irreparable misidentification.”  Before turning to
how that linkage occurs and what it demands, this Article first explores
current “reliability” standards.
II. THE THREADBARE NATURE OF THE RELIABILITY STANDARD
Assessing the stringency of the reliability standard is in part difficult,
as trial court decisions suppressing eyewitness testimony, unless subject to
a prosecutor’s interlocutory appeal, are often unreported and therefore
unmeasurable.  Yet review of appellate decisions affirming a finding of re-
liability and denying suppression shows the rule to be one of inclusion
rather than a barrier to proof.
This is easily demonstrated.  Cases abound where the opportunity to
observe is limited to seconds yet found to be sufficient to permit a finding
of reliability;67 where the limited opportunity to view is compounded by a
66. Id. at 728–29.
67. See, e.g., State v. Mitchell, 16 A.3d 730, 735–36 (Conn. App. Ct. 2011)
(“Even if the victim only saw the defendant’s face for a second, as the defendant
suggests, that is still sufficient to support the court’s finding that the victim had a
substantial opportunity to view the defendant.”); State v. McCarthy, 939 A.2d 1195,
1203 (Conn. App. Ct. 2008) (finding that witness viewed defendant for few
seconds under chaotic conditions from 300 feet away); State v. Lopez, 911 A.2d
1099, 1121 (Conn. 2007) (finding that witness saw masked attacker for two or
three seconds); State v. Ledbetter, 881 A.2d 290, 304 (Conn. 2005) (finding that
witness focused on assailant’s faces for “a matter of seconds” during struggle);
State v. Morgan, 877 A.2d 739, 804 (Conn. 2005) (reiterating witness testimony
that she briefly observed two individuals’ faces as they ran through door and pul-
led down masks); State v. Vega, 537 A.2d 505, 508 (Conn. App. Ct. 1988) (finding
off-duty officer’s view of alleged burglar during nighttime pursuit sufficient “despite
its brevity”); State v. Ledbetter, 441 A.2d 595, 600 (Conn. 1981) (finding that wit-
ness’s view of robber for fifteen or twenty seconds “will pass muster”); State v. Sal-
gado, 974 P.2d 661, 668 (N.M. 1999) (finding that ten second viewing of shooter
in evening was sufficient); McElrath v. Commonwealth, 592 A.2d 740, 743–44 (Pa.
Super. Ct. 1991) (finding five second viewing of assailant in gunpoint robbery
sufficient).
10
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partial or complete masking of the face;68 or where the initial description
differed radically from the defendant.69
Another way to assess the stringency of the reliability standard is in its
failure to screen out demonstrably erroneous identifications.  A study of
the first 250 DNA exonerations showed that of the 190 in which eyewitness
testimony was part or the entirety of the inculpatory proof, only fifty-six
percent involved appeals challenging admissibility or other aspects of the
identification evidence; and of the thirty-nine who objected on grounds
of police impropriety in the identification process none was granted
relief.70  This comports with general appellate acceptance of reliability
determinations.71
Whether because of the de minimis protection or because of its a-scien-
tific origins, the Manson/Biggers test has been repudiated by several states.
Utah began this trend, “improving” the Biggers factors with a “more empiri-
cally based approach” and coupling the increased scrutiny with a man-
dated jury instruction in cases where the suspect identification was
admitted.72  Kansas followed, adopting both the revised reliability criteria
68. See, e.g., United States v. Domina, 784 F.2d 1361, 1370 (9th Cir. 1986).
The court noted:
Bishoff testified that she had an opportunity to observe the robber for 20
seconds . . . .  She stated that although the robber was masked, she was
able to identify Domina because of the forward protrusion of his nose,
the shape of his face, the lower portion of his face not covered by the
mask, and other facial features, as well as his general build and body
features.
Id. See also In re N.K.M., Nos. 04–09–00717–CV, 04–09–00718–CV, 2010 WL
3443210, at *5 (Tex. Ct. App. Sept. 1, 2010) (approving identification after rob-
bery by perpetrator with mask that showed only robber’s eyes and subsequent
“eyes-only” photographic array).
69. See, e.g., State v. Sanchez, 15 A.3d 1182, 1187 (Conn. App. Ct. 2010) (find-
ing identification reliable where witness initially described perpetrator “as a young
black male possibly with a tattoo on his arm[,]” but defendant was “forty-two years
old, having no tattoo on his arm and, at least as the defendant attempts to describe
him, Hispanic”); Ibarra v. State, 11 S.W.3d 189, 196 (Tex. Crim. App. 1999) (find-
ing no error in allowing identification testimony where witness “did not notice
[defendant] had a full beard instead of just a mustache”).
70. See GARRETT, supra note 21, at 187.
71. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d, 872, 919 n.9 (N.J. 2011) (“[W]ith the
exception of one case reversed on appeal, we have found no reported Appellate
Division decision since 1977 that reversed a conviction because the trial court
failed to suppress identification evidence.”).
72. State v. Ramirez, 817 P.2d 774, 780–81 (Utah 1991). Ramirez’s recon-
figured reliability criteria are:
(1) The opportunity of the witness to view the actor during the event; (2)
the witness’s degree of attention to the actor at the time of the event; (3)
the witness’s capacity to observe the event, including his or her physical
and mental acuity; (4) whether the witness’s identification was made
spontaneously and remained consistent thereafter, or whether it was the
product of suggestion; and (5) the nature of the event being observed
and the likelihood that the witness would perceive, remember and relate
it correctly.  This last area includes such factors as whether the event was
11
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and the concomitant commitment to utilizing a jury instruction to ensure
Due Process.73
Massachusetts and New York sidestepped the reliability quandary at
least in part, holding inadmissible out-of-court identifications that were
“unnecessarily or impermissibly suggestive”74 or freighted with “unaccept-
able suggestiveness.”75  Wisconsin made the threshold for using a showup
more stringent, essentially an exigency standard.76  Wisconsin explained
this repudiation of the federal standard on two grounds: the volume of
scientific knowledge that became available after 1976, and the impact that
suggestivity has on the reliability factors, an impact that makes it “ex-
tremely difficult, if not impossible, for courts to distinguish between iden-
tifications that were reliable and identifications that were unreliable.”77
In a recent and extensive rejection of the federal reliability factors,
the New Jersey Supreme Court explicitly embraced and incorporated the
scientific research.  In State v. Henderson,78 the Court rejected the absolute
or automatic exclusion approach of Massachusetts, New York, and Wiscon-
sin, but invigorated the reliability inquiry of Utah and Kansas with a strong
focus on science.79  A Due Process inquiry would be triggered by proof of
some suggestivity,80 after which a reliability determination is to incorporate
both estimator and systems variables.81 Henderson recognized that even
an ordinary one in the mind of the observer during the time it was ob-
served, and whether the race of the actor was the same as the observer’s.
Id. (citation omitted).
73. See State v. Hunt, 69 P.3d 571, 577 (Kan. 2003) (“We conclude that the
Ramirez factors should be adopted as the model for examining such issues and that
when requested or where such identification is a central issue in a case, a caution-
ary instruction regarding eyewitness identification should be given.”).
74. Commonwealth v. Martin, 850 N.E.2d 555, 560 n.3 (Mass. 2006).
75. People v. Duuvon, 77 N.Y.2d 541, 543 (N.Y. 1991).
76. State v. Dubose, 699 N.W.2d 582, 584–585 (Wis. 2005).  The court stated:
[A] showup will not be admissible unless, based on the totality of the
circumstances, the showup was necessary. A showup will not be necessary,
however, unless the police lacked probable cause to make an arrest or, as
a result of other exigent circumstances, could not have conducted a
lineup or photo array.
Id.
77. Id. at 592.
78. 27 A.3d 872 (N.J. 2011).
79. Id. at 878.
80. Id. at 920.
81. Id.  The terms “estimator” and “systems” variables were developed by eye-
witness researcher Professor Gary Wells. See Gary L. Wells, Applied Eyewitness-Testi-
mony Research: System Variables and Estimator Variables, 36 J. PERSONALITY & SOC.
PSYCHOL. 1546 (1978).  The former term includes those factors attendant to the
crime, the criminal and the observer—duration, race, the presence of a weapon,
levels of stress, degree of attention, lighting—which may affect perception and
memory but the impact of which can only be estimated; and the latter references
the responsive mechanisms of the “system”—the police interview, line-up instruc-
tions, blind or non-blind administration—that can be controlled and the impact of
which can more readily be quantified. Id.  The New Jersey Supreme Court identi-
12
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this expanded reliability inquiry would result in few exclusions,82 but
linked the admissibility to other trial protections, in particular “enhanced”
jury instructions, both at trial’s end and “during trial if warranted . . . .”83
Following Henderson, the Oregon Supreme Court similarly incorpo-
rated the body of eyewitness research into its evidentiary rules (rather than
a Due Process analysis) and made reliability the linchpin of evidentiary
admissibility.
When there are facts demonstrating that a witness could have re-
lied on something other than his or her own perceptions to iden-
tify the defendant, the state—as the proponent of the
identification—must establish by a preponderance of the evi-
dence that the identification was based on a permissible basis
rather than an impermissible one, such as suggestive police
procedures.84
The Oregon Supreme Court added that even where the suggestivity does
not preclude a finding of the eyewitness having relevant information
drawn from personal knowledge, application of Rule 403 considerations of
“unfair prejudice, confusion of the issues [or] misleading the jury” may
warrant exclusion or limitations on the testimony.85  Yet even with this
invigorated evidentiary screening, the Oregon Court concluded that there
would still be admitted “most eyewitness identifications.”86  However, a
strong role for expert testimony was urged to enable “judges and jurors to
evaluate eyewitness identification testimony according to relevant and
meaningful criteria.”87  This trial “offset” to the admissibility decision, like
the enhanced jury instruction mandate of Henderson, is returned to in Sec-
tion V.
This limited array of states repudiating the strictures of the federal
standard finds strong support in academic literature in both psychology
and law.  The most trenchant scientific criticism of the Manson standards
comes from Professor Gary Wells, perhaps the leading researcher on eye-
witness identification in the United States.  As Wells explained in 2009:
Perhaps the biggest difference between the views of psychological
scientists and those in the legal system is the legal system’s be-
fied nine estimator and thirteen systems variables in its non-exclusive list. Hender-
son, 27 A.3d at 920–22.
82. Id. at 919 (“[W]e recognize that most identifications will be admitted in
evidence.”).
83. Id. at 924.
84. State v. Lawson, 352 Or. 724, 755 (Or. 2012) (en banc).
85. Id. at 762.
86. Id. (“That is so because, although possible, it is doubtful that issues con-
cerning one or more of the estimator variables that we have identified will, without
more, be enough to support an inference of unreliability sufficient to justify the
exclusion of the eyewitness identification.”).
87. Id. at 761.
13
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lief . . . that concerns about suggestive identification procedures
can be trumped by the types of considerations used in the second
prong (the reliability test using the Manson criteria).88
The specific scientific criticisms of the Manson test are its reliance on wit-
ness “retrospective self-reports because of well-known tendencies for such
reports being at odds with objective facts[;] . . . the precarious nature of
the relation between the Manson factors and eyewitness identification ac-
curacy[;] . . . [and] that at least three of the Manson factors are not inde-
pendent of the suggestive procedure itself.”89  Of particular concern is
that suggestive procedures may “augment” the witness’s memory of the
event, in effect inflating the self-report of how long the event occurred,
the witness’s degree of attention, and the opportunity for viewing the
perpetrator(s).90
If there is an ultimate concern expressed by Wells and seen as the
disconnect between the Court’s reliability determination and the findings
of more than three decades of scientific research, it is the Court’s view that
errors occasioned by suggestiveness can be repaired.  As Wells explains,
“Eyewitness scientists generally believe that a mistaken identification taints
the witness’[s] memory toward the identified person.”91
The scientific disquiet with the Supreme Court’s reliability analysis,
and its categoric separation from suggestiveness, is echoed in the aca-
demic literature.  Other commentators have proposed a radical restructur-
ing of the admissibility determination,92 one based on a three-pronged
assessment:
• whether the interview of the eyewitness gathered maximum infor-
mation, avoided contamination of the witness’s memory, and did
not inflate the witness’s confidence;93
• if the identification procedures in the case were fair and unbiased,
an assessment to be made using varying scientific criteria proposed
by the commentators;94 and
88. Gary L. Wells & Deah S. Quinlivan, Suggestive Eyewitness Identification Proce-
dures and the Supreme Court’s Reliability Test in Light of Eyewitness Science: 30 Years Later,
33 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 1, 9 (2009).
89. Id.
90. Id.
91. Id. at 15.
92. See Richard A. Wise, Clifford S. Fishman & Martin A. Safer, How to Analyze
the Accuracy of Eyewitness Testimony in a Criminal Case, 42 CONN. L. REV. 435, 442
(2009).
93. Id. at 470.
94. Id. at 471.  These factors include lineups or photo arrays only upon a
showing of probable cause, and only when conducted with blind administration, in
a sequential manner, and with proper filler selection and instructions. Id. at
485–94.
14
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• what factors increased or decreased the likelihood of accurate eye-
witness testimony and identification.95
For these commentators, with law and science backgrounds, this method-
ology “provides a comprehensive analytical framework for identifying and
organizing the myriad of disparate factors that affect the accuracy of eye-
witness testimony” and incentivizes the police to use fair and reliable
procedures.96
Another proposal was to replace the Manson test with rules of identifi-
cation procedure administration, the theory being that this would provide
guidance to police, deter the use of unduly suggestive conduct, and avoid
arbitrariness.97  As the commentators urge:
These guidelines would be selected to address major issues affect-
ing the structural integrity of the procedures—not to dictate
every step . . . . However, courts also would remain free in ex-
traordinary cases to exclude identifications that are the products
of procedures that, while complying with the minimum guide-
lines, are nonetheless so suggestive as to render the identification
unreliable.98
Part of the ultimate justification for this rule is its ease of application, as it
determines whether the process was problematic, not the unanswerable
question of whether any particular identification is reliable.99
A third approach is that espoused over the course of a decade’s writ-
ing and advocacy by Professor Margery Koosed.100  At its core, and based
on the conclusion that the Manson test may actually encourage the use of
suggestive identification procedures because it places a premium on secur-
95. Id. at 471.
96. Id. at 473–474.  Even under this proposed regime, however, the authors
urge admissibility where the identification procedure “was prompted by investiga-
tive necessity” or where the prosecution can prove that an in-court identification is
“the product of the eyewitness’s memory of the crime, unaffected by the contami-
nation.” Id. at 506.
97. See Timothy P. O’Toole & Giovanna Shay, Manson v. Brathwaite Revisited:
Towards a New Rule of Decision for Due Process Challenges to Eyewitness Identification
Procedures, 41 VAL. U. L. REV. 109 (2006).
98. Id. at 138.
99. Id. at 141.  The authors proceed to acknowledge that the proposed rule
would “under-enforce” Due Process, i.e., not necessarily ensure that all resulting
identifications meet the Due Process minimum. Id.  Yet absent from the article is a
clear definition of what Due Process requires, other than “furthering fairness and
reliability.” Id. at 110.
100. Margery Malkin Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Prac-
tices to Protect the Innocent, 42 CREIGHTON L. REV. 595 (2009); Margery Malkin
Koosed, The Proposed Innocence Protection Act Won’t—Unless It Also Curbs Mistaken Eye-
witness Identifications, 63 OHIO ST. L.J. 263, 276–78 (2002).
15
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ing an identification expressed with certainty and confidence,101 Koosed
urges a strict exclusionary rule for out-of-court identifications:
The Stovall per se exclusionary rule would apply when any imper-
missibly suggestive eyewitness identification occurred, even if
neither the police nor the prosecutors planned or conducted the
encounter between the eyewitness and the defendant.  Under my
approach, an in-court eyewitness identification would be allowed
only if the prosecution could prove by clear and convincing evi-
dence that the prior identification was not conducive to irrepara-
ble mistaken identification.102
Koosed proposed this in 2002, and acknowledged appropriate modifica-
tions in her 2009 article: the additional elements are to place the burden
of proving independence and admissibility of any in-court identification
on the prosecution, “a requirement that the prosecution cannot use self-
reporting matters unless the prosecution demonstrates these are reliable”
to establish independence, and “[t]ightly construing the accuracy of the
Manson prior description factor, so as to include only a truly prior descrip-
tion of the perpetrator . . . .”103
Regardless of the merits of these proposals, and their strong founda-
tion in “gold standard” science,104 the Court’s reaffirmance of Manson in
Perry eliminates the prospect of any of these tests being adopted as a fed-
eral constitutional mandate in the foreseeable future.  Whether, as this
Article proposes, Perry instead adds consideration of whether the trial pro-
cess enhances (or at least informs) the reliability test, is dependent first on
an understanding of the Due Process threshold for admitting evidence,
addressed in the next section.
III. DUE PROCESS AND A CONSTITUTIONAL THRESHOLD FOR THE
ADMISSION OF EVIDENCE
There is no specific formulation of what Due Process guarantees in
the criminal trial setting, particularly as to the admission of evidence.  At
its most general, the Due Process guarantee assures a right to “reasonable
notice and an opportunity to be heard . . . .”105  The “opportunity to be
101. Koosed, Reforming Eyewitness Identification Law and Practices to Protect the
Innocent, supra note 100, at 626.
102. Id. at 624.
103. Id. at 631.
104. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 916 (N.J. 2011) (“The research . . . is
not only extensive, but . . . represents the gold standard in terms of the applicabil-
ity of social science research to the law.” (quotation omitted)).
105. Oyler v. Boles, 368 U.S. 448, 452 (1962).
16
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heard” includes a “meaningful” opportunity to respond to and challenge
the Government’s proof.106
As a barrier to the admission of evidence other than out-of-court iden-
tifications, the Due Process threshold is again a low one.107  To survive a
Due Process challenge of evidentiary insufficiency, the test is “whether af-
ter viewing the evidence in the light most favorable to the prosecution, any
rational trier of fact could have found the essential elements of the crime
beyond a reasonable doubt.”108  As recently elaborated, and emphasizing
the importance of jurors drawing appropriate inferences from evidence,
“Jackson leaves juries broad discretion in deciding what inferences to draw
from the evidence presented at trial, requiring only that jurors ‘draw rea-
sonable inferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.’”109
Of more limited utility in the eyewitness context is the Court’s sen-
tencing Due Process jurisprudence.  What is clear at a minimum, at least
in the capital case setting, is that evidence on which a sentence of death is
to be based must be disclosed to the defendant, rather than submitted to
the sentencing judge(s) for ex parte evaluation.110  The right to “explain”
evidence is critical:
[T]he argument rests on the erroneous premise that the partici-
pation of counsel is superfluous to the process of evaluating the
relevance and significance of aggravating and mitigating facts.
Our belief that debate between adversaries is often essential to
the truth-seeking function of trials requires us also to recognize
the importance of giving counsel an opportunity to comment on
facts which may influence the sentencing decision in capital
cases.111
The third area where Due Process restrictions have been imposed on
evidentiary matters involves quasi-criminal proceedings where a revocation
of probation or parole is being sought by the government.  The Court has
approved admissibility of a wide range of evidence, including materials
that “would not be admissible in an adversary criminal trial” because of the
narrow nature of the inquiry and the attendant “right to confront and
cross-examine adverse witnesses (unless the hearing officer specifically
106. Jackson v. Virginia, 443 U.S. 307, 314 (1979) (“[A] person cannot incur
the loss of liberty for an offense without notice and a meaningful opportunity to
defend.”).
107. The following text, surveying the various Due Process formulations for
evidentiary admissibility or sufficiency, draws heavily on Jules Epstein, Avoiding
Trial By Rumor: Identifying the Due Process Threshold for Hearsay Evidence After The De-
mise of the Ohio v. Roberts “Reliability” Standard, 77 UMKC L. REV. 119, 131–47
(2008).
108. Jackson, 443 U.S. at 319.
109. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (quoting Jackson, 443
U.S. at 319).
110. Gardner v. Florida, 430 U.S. 349, 360 (1977).
111. Id.
17
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finds good cause for not allowing confrontation) . . . .”112  Yet even in
these circumstances, courts applying this Due Process test have incorpo-
rated a reliability assessment,113 albeit one demanding only “minimal indi-
cia of reliability.”114  That threshold lacks further definition, but
seemingly must be sufficient that a trained judge or revocation authority
could meaningfully assess its weight.  This is essential to meet the com-
mand that there be “an informal hearing structured to assure that the
finding of a parole violation will be based on verified facts . . . .”115
It warrants mention that this low threshold finds parallels in the law of
evidence, particularly regarding the admission of expert testimony.  The
Court in Daubert v. Merrell Dow Pharmaceuticals, Inc.116 set the admissibility
threshold as that of “evidentiary reliability,” explaining that “evidentiary
reliability will be based upon scientific validity.”117  Although the Court
made clear that “validity” is measured by whether “the principle sup-
port[s] what it purports to show[,]” this was a tolerant approach, as it ac-
knowledged the admissibility of “shaky” evidence.118  The Court stated,
“Vigorous cross-examination, presentation of contrary evidence, and care-
ful instruction on the burden of proof are the traditional and appropriate
means of attacking shaky but admissible evidence.”119  That tolerance of
“shaky” evidence mirrors the Due Process standard—admit testimony if
there is some foundational basis, and if the factfinder has sufficient means
to parse and weigh it.
Taken together, these Due Process cases support a threshold where
evidence must have minimal reliability in a system where the accused has
the opportunity to meaningfully respond and explain such that
factfinders—in particular jurors—may meaningfully “draw reasonable in-
ferences from basic facts to ultimate facts.”120  Given the clear deficiencies
112. Morrissey v. Brewer, 408 U.S. 471, 489 (1972).
113. See, e.g., United States v. Kelley, 446 F.3d 688, 692 (7th Cir. 2006) (“[W]e
have interpreted Morrissey and Gagnon to permit the admission of reliable hearsay at
revocation hearings . . . .”); United States v. Klatt, No. 2:07-cr-13, 2010 WL
5178115, at *2 (W.D. Mich. Dec. 3, 2010) (collecting cases applying “reliability”
standard to hearsay admitted at revocation proceedings).
114. United States v. Reme, 738 F.2d 1156, 1167 (11th Cir. 1984).
115. Morrissey, 408 U.S. at 484.
116. 509 U.S. 579 (1993).
117. Id. at 599–600 (quotation omitted).
118. Id. at 590 n.9, 596.
119. Id. at 596. See also Deputy v. Lehman Bros., 345 F.3d 494, 506 (7th Cir.
2003).  The court explained:
[I]ssues of credibility and persuasiveness . . . are relevant only in valuing
the testimony, not in determining its admissibility . . . .  [I]t is not the trial
court’s role to decide whether an expert’s opinion is correct.  The trial
court is limited to determining whether expert testimony is pertinent to
an issue in the case and whether the methodology underlying that testi-
mony is sound.
Id. (citation and quotation omitted).
120. Coleman v. Johnson, 132 S. Ct. 2060, 2064 (2012) (citation and quota-
tion omitted).
18
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in eyewitness identification testimony, and the demonstrated weakness
shown by factfinders charged with measuring the accuracy of such proof,
that threshold requires either enhanced screening or more substantial
compensatory tools at trial.
IV. THE FAILURE OF THE TRIAL PROCESS IN ASSESSING
EYEWITNESS RELIABILITY
The chronicity of eyewitness error, across at least a century of Ameri-
can criminal prosecutions, cannot be doubted.  Judicial recognition of the
problem is over a century old: in a homicide trial in the late 1800s, the jury
was instructed that “[q]uestions concerning the identity of persons, ani-
mals, and vehicles are liable to confusion, uncertainty, and mistake[,]”121
and in 1967 the Supreme Court penned its famous lines emphasizing the
“vagaries of eyewitness identification.”122  Every survey of wrongful convic-
tions, beginning early in the twentieth century and continuing on to the
present, has emphasized and catalogued proven cases of mistaken
identification.123
Along with the documenting of eyewitness error in judicial decisions,
government reports, and scholarship, there have been recurrences of well-
publicized cases of alleged or proven eyewitness error.  In the early part of
the twentieth century, the prosecution and conviction of Sacco and Van-
zetti raised serious questions about eyewitness reliability, concerns promul-
gated by then-law professor Felix Frankfurter in his 1927 article, The Case
121. Commonwealth v. Clemmer, 42 A. 675, 677 (Pa. 1899).  The phenome-
non was discussed decades earlier:
No one, however, of professional experience in trials at law, who has had
opportunities of observing the errors which witnesses, of the best charac-
ter, innocently fall into in delivering their testimony, not only of long
past, but of recent transactions, will be willing to say that any evidence,
from whatever witness it may come, may not be founded in some mistake.
On the subject of the identity of persons, instances have occurred of the
most surprising description. They have occurred in relation to brute ani-
mals, as well as to men.
In re Williams, No. 17,701, 1839 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 3, at *17–18 (E.D. Pa. Mar. 8,
1839). See also Lincoln v. People, 20 Ill. 364 (Ill. 1858) (granting new trial based
on risk of mistaken identification).
122. United States v. Wade, 338 U.S. 218, 228 (1967) (“[T]he vagaries of eye-
witness identification are well-known; the annals of criminal law are rife with in-
stances of mistaken identification.”).
123. See EDWIN M. BORCHARD, CONVICTING THE INNOCENT 13–15 (Garden City
Publ’g Co. 1932); JEROME FRANK & BARBARA FRANK, NOT GUILTY (Doubleday & Co.
1957); GARRETT, supra note 21; EDWARD RADIN, THE INNOCENTS 9 (Tower Publ’n
1964); EDWARD CONNORS ET AL., CONVICTED BY JURIES, EXONERATED BY SCIENCE:
CASE STUDIES IN THE USE OF DNA EVIDENCE TO ESTABLISH INNOCENCE AFTER TRIAL
(Nat’l Inst. of Just. 1996), available at https://www.ncjrs.gov/pdffiles/dnaevid.pdf;
Report of the Governor’s Commission on Capital Punishment, Capital Punishment
(Apr. 2002), http://www.law.northwestern.edu/wrongfulconvictions/issues/death
penatly/clemency/complete_report.pdf; Report on the Prevention of Miscarriages
of Justice, FPT Heads of Prosecutions Committee Working Group (Sept. 2004),
http://www.justice.gc.ca/en/dept/pub/hop/toc.html.
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of Sacco and Vanzetti.124  Frankfurter wrote “[w]hat is the worth of identifi-
cation testimony even when uncontradicted[,]”125 and quoted at length
from a Boston psychiatrist’s 1926 letter to the editor describing at least
one of the trial identifications as “psychologically impossible.”126
In 1979, it was the case of Father Pagano, a priest accused of having
committed seven armed robberies in which the description was of a “gen-
tleman bandit.”127  It was only when a man of similar appearance con-
fessed that charges were withdrawn.  Newspaper accounts detailed the
eyewitness errors and the fact that the actual perpetrator passed a lie de-
tector test but that some of the eyewitnesses nonetheless persisted in their
belief that Pagano was the perpetrator.128  Occasional articles brought at-
tention to other cases of mistaken identification.129  A televised experi-
ment in the mid-1970s, where viewers were asked to watch a video of a
crime and then identify the perpetrator, again publicized the risk of eye-
witness error—only seventeen percent gave the right answer.130
What brought eyewitness error to the fore more clearly and perva-
sively were the recurring and highly publicized exonerations brought
about by DNA analysis.  Nearly one thousand print media articles ad-
dressed this issue between 1996 and 2012,131 and various news and feature
television programs documented the same.132
124. See Felix Frankfurter, The Case of Sacco and Vanzetti, ATLANTIC MONTHLY,
Mar. 1927, at 409–32; see also FELIX FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VAN-
ZETTI: A CRITICAL ANALYSIS FOR LAWYERS AND LAYMAN (1927).  Frankfurter’s book
was not an academic tome of restricted circulation; rather, it was published first in
the Atlantic Monthly magazine and has been described as a “hugely significant
moment in the public history” of this case that “sparked a growing focus” on the
trial. MOSHIK TEMKIN, THE SACCO-VANZETTI AFFAIR: AMERICA ON TRIAL 30–31 (Yale
Univ. Press 2009).
125. FRANKFURTER, THE CASE OF SACCO AND VANZETTI, supra note 124, at 30.
126. Id. at 14 (quoting letter of Dr. Morton Prince, published in Boston Her-
ald October 30, 1926).
127. See Noah Clements, Flipping a Coin: A Solution for the Inherent Unreliability
of Eyewitness Identification Testimony, 40 IND. L. REV. 271, 275 (2007).
128. See, e.g., Judith Valente, 1 Charge Left Against Priest; Pennsylvania May Drop
Case, WASH. POST, Sept. 1, 1979, at C3.  The coverage was national. See Melinda
Beck, The Polite Bandit: A Priest on Trial, NEWSWEEK, Aug. 20, 1979, at 26.  The Fa-
ther Pagano publicity continued into the mid-1980s as news media reported on his
unsuccessful attempt to sue police over his wrongful arrests. See, e.g., “Bandit” Priest
Loses Case Against Police, UNITED PRESS INT’L, Apr. 4, 1984.
129. See, e.g., Ted Gest, When Nightmare of False Arrest Comes True, U.S. NEWS &
WORLD REPORT, Dec. 17, 1984, at 45.
130. Id. The experiment and its outcome were not limited to a regional tele-
vision market, but were described to a national audience in Scientific American.
See Robert Buckhout, Eyewitness Testimony, 231 SCIENTIFIC AMERICAN 23 (1974).
131. A June 14, 2012 search of the LEXIS “News, All” (English Full text)
database with parameters “dna w/18 eyewitness w/22 exonera! and date aft 1/1/
1996” produced 929 results.
132. See, e.g., Frontline: What Jennifer Saw (PBS television broadcast Feb. 25,
1997), transcript available at http://www.pbs.org/wgbh/pages/frontline/shows/
dna/ (highlighting wrongful conviction of Ronald Thompson); Sixty Minutes: Eye-
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The recurring and at times pervasive and even sensational publicity
surrounding eyewitness error has not translated into juror, or even judi-
cial, comprehension of the foibles of eyewitness testimony and the abun-
dant psychological research explaining the triggers and conditions that
generate erroneous identifications.  To the contrary, myths and mis-
perceptions about eyewitness accuracy remain pervasive.133
The persistence of the view that memory is immutable and the claim
“I’ll never forget that face” has scientific validity cannot be questioned.  In
Juror Understanding of Eyewitness Testimony: A Survey of 1000 Potential Jurors in
the District of Columbia, data were amassed from a representative pool of
prospective jurors showing a significant “disconnect” between scientific re-
search and layperson beliefs.134  The findings included the following:
• Juror Misunderstandings of Memory in General: “Almost two-thirds
of the respondents [sixty-six percent] thought the statement ‘I
never forget a face’ applied ‘very well’ or ‘fairly well’ to them.”135
• Weapon Focus: “Thirty-seven percent . . . thought the presence of a
weapon would make a witness’[s] memory for event details more re-
liable, while thirty-three percent believed that the presence of a
weapon either would have no effect or were not sure of what effect
a weapon would have.”136
• The Impact of Violence and/or Stress: “Thirty-nine percent [con-
cluded] . . . that event violence . . . make[s] a witness’s memory for
event details more reliable, while thirty-three percent . . . thought
that event violence either would have no effect or were not sure of
what effect event violence would have.”137
• Duration of the Incident: “Over [forty percent] . . . thought that
witness time estimates were accurate or were not sure whether such
estimates were accurate . . . . [Almost twenty-five percent] believed
that witnesses underestimate the actual time.”138
witness: How Accurate Is Visual Memory? (CBS television broadcast July 11, 2009),
available at http://www.cbsnews.com/2100-18560_162-4848039.html.
133. See ALISON WINTER, MEMORY: FRAGMENTS OF A MODERN HISTORY (Univ. of
Chicago Press 2012) (discussing potential by-product of persistence, within
medicine, psychiatry, psychology and public discourse, of belief that at least some
memories—particularly those of significant events—are stored as “flashbulb mo-
ments,” are immutable, and may be recovered).
134. See Elizabeth F. Loftus et al., Juror Understanding of Eyewitness Testimony:
A Survey of 1000 Potential Jurors in the District of Columbia, http://www.pdsdc.org/
SpecialLitigation/SLDSystemResources/Article%20by%20Dr.%20Elizabeth%20
Loftus%20and%20Tim%20O’Toole.pdf; see also State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872,
896–910 (N.J. 2011) (detailing science contradicting these perceptions).
135. Loftus et al., supra note 134, at 6.
136. Id. at 8.
137. Id. at 9 (footnote omitted).
138. Id. at 11.
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These were not the only conflicts between lay beliefs and the findings of
eyewitness researchers.  Few prospective jurors understood the only slight
correlation between confidence and accuracy, nearly half thought racial
differences between the percipient witness and the perpetrator had no
impact on accuracy, and further data showed the respondents’ unfamiliar-
ity with the potential suggestivity in showup and lineup procedures.139
The results of this survey are not idiosyncratic.  A 2011 study, survey-
ing over 1,800 persons in the United States, had stark findings as to eyewit-
ness reliability.140  According to the study, “63% agreed that ‘human
memory works like a video camera, accurately recording the events we see
and hear so that we can review and inspect them later.’ . . . 47.6% agreed
that ‘once you have experienced an event and formed a memory of it, that
memory does not change.’”141  Other surveys report similar findings,142
and some courts have drawn the same conclusion.143
The knowledge deficit is compounded by the limited efficacy of tradi-
tional adversarial trial tools, in particular cross-examination.  Notwith-
standing the contention that cross-examination is the “greatest legal
engine ever invented for the discovery of truth[,]”144 it has limited utility
139. Id. at 13–20.
140. Daniel J. Simons & Christopher F. Chabris, What People Believe About How
Memory Works: A Representative Survey of the U.S. Population, PLOS ONE (2011), avail-
able at http://www.plosone.org/article/info%3Adoi%2F10.1371%2Fjournal.pone.
0022757.
141. Id.
142. J. Don Read & Sarah L. Desmarais, Expert Psychology Testimony on Eyewit-
ness Identification: A Matter of Common Sense?, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOL-
OGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 115–41 (Brian Cutler ed., Oxford Univ. Press
2009). See, e.g., Richard A. Wise & Martin A. Safer, What US Judges Know and Believe
About Eyewitness Testimony, APPL. COGNIT. PSYCHOL. 427, 427–43 (2004) (positing
that knowledge deficit is not limited to lay jurors, as many judges have similar
beliefs).
143. See State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1108 (Utah 2009) (“[T]here is little
doubt that juries are generally unaware of these deficiencies in human perception
and memory and thus give great weight to eyewitness identifications.  Indeed, ju-
ries seemed to be swayed the most by the confidence of an eyewitness, even though
such confidence correlates only weakly with accuracy.”) (footnote omitted) see also
State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 911 (N.J. 2011) (noting that studies “reveal gen-
erally that people do not intuitively understand all of the relevant scientific find-
ings [and as] a result, there is a need to promote greater juror understanding of
those issues”); Tillman v. State, 354 S.W.3d 425, 442 (Tex. Crim. App. 2011) (citing
to expert testimony that “research reveals that jurors do not understand eyewitness
identification completely and do not know how to apply what they do know to a
particular case”).
144. See California v. Green, 399 U.S. 149, 158 (1970) (quoting JOHN H. WIG-
MORE, EVIDENCE § 1367, at 29 (Little, Brown & Co., 3d ed. 1940)).
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in eyewitness identification cases145 and at times works at cross-
purposes.146
The inadequacy of cross-examination derives from a number of fac-
tors.  In individual cases, it may arise from the lack of knowledge regard-
ing eyewitness research that many defense lawyers still have.147  More
importantly, given the origin of cross-examination as a tool for exposing
deceit and corrupt motives,148 this mechanism for adversarial examination
has significantly diminished utility with a witness who has only the purest
of motivations—identifying the criminal—and is not prevaricating even
when making a mistaken identification.  Because jurors have a “nearly re-
ligious faith in the accuracy of eyewitness accounts[,]” the hurdle is raised
higher.149
This inutility of cross-examination in the eyewitness identification
context is well-documented,150 and goes beyond anecdotal accounts.151
Mock jury studies have shown, for example, there was no significant differ-
ence in the results obtained by the tyros and those obtained by the profes-
sionals, when the skill of the cross-examiner was varied to test for outcome
effect.152  A more daunting result was obtained when the variable was not
attorney skill but eyewitness capacity—when a mock crime scenario was
145. See State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038 (Haw. 2012) (“Cross-examina-
tion may not adequately apprise the jury of the factors it should consider in assess-
ing the reliability of eyewitness identification testimony or of the deficiencies of
eyewitness identification testimony.”).
146. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 727 (detailing  limited potential for cross-
examination in mistaken identification cases).
147. See Jennifer L. Devenport, Christopher D. Kimbrough & Brian L. Cutler,
Effectiveness of Traditional Safeguards Against Erroneous Conviction Arising From Mis-
taken Eyewitness Identification, in EXPERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWIT-
NESS IDENTIFICATION 57–59 (Brian Cutler ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009) (noting
research showing varying levels of knowledge among defense counsel and that “at-
torneys may not always use the factors they know . . . .”).  The limits of cross-exami-
nation may be further restricted in cases where no expert testimony is allowed and
the state’s jury instruction does not provide the basics of eyewitness science, as
attempts to cross-examine the lay witness about issues in identification psychology
may be barred because they are not based on record evidence.
148. See JOHN H. LANGBEIN, THE ORIGINS OF ADVERSARY CRIMINAL TRIAL (A.W.
Brian Simpson ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2003).
149. ELIZABETH F. LOFTUS & JAMES M. DOYLE, EYEWITNESS TESTIMONY: CIVIL
AND CRIMINAL §§ 10-1 (Lexis, 3d ed. 1997).
150. See Epstein, supra note 20, at 770–74.
151. This author has found, from observing trials, reading trial transcripts,
and speaking with attorneys at lectures on eyewitness identification law and strate-
gies, that the lawyers often proceed in disregard of the scientific research and in
ways that reinforce juror misconceptions about the reliability of identification testi-
mony.  By way of illustration, there is often a desire to extend the time of viewing, if
there is some discrepancy in the description (as when a witness fails to describe a
mustache or scar), even though jurors do not focus on such variances and instead
rely on the greater opportunity to observe.
152. See R. C. L. Lindsay, Gary L. Wells & Fergus J. O’Connor, Mock-Juror Belief
of Accurate and Inaccurate Eyewitnesses: A Replication and Extension, 13 LAW & HUM.
BEHAV. 333 (1989).
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presented to “jurors,” a seventy-two percent conviction rate based on eye-
witness identification dropped only four percentage points when the sce-
nario was altered to include the partial blindness of the witness.153
Finally, the skilled cross-examination, which identifies the system and
estimator variables as being present in the case, may inadvertently rein-
force juror misperceptions.  Despite the consistent findings that the pres-
ence of a weapon may detract from identification reliability, as the victim’s
or witness’s attention is drawn away from the perpetrator’s face and to-
ward the dangerous implement,154 many juror-eligible adults believe that
the presence of a weapon enhances attention and reliability.155  Thus, a
skilled cross-examination, derived from reliable science, risks an incorrect
determination of eyewitness reliability and accuracy.156
This diminished value of cross-examination is not automatically offset
by either expert testimony or jury instructions.  As to the former, the great
majority of jurisdictions permit expert testimony.157 However, there are
153. See Elizabeth F. Loftus, Reconstructing Memory: The Incredible Eyewitness, 8
PSYCHOL. TODAY 116 (1974).  Later studies with similar scenarios had lower rates,
but still showed juror belief even when the witness was discredited. See also BRIAN
L. CUTLER & STEVEN D. PENROD, MISTAKEN IDENTIFICATION: THE EYEWITNESS, PSY-
CHOLOGY AND THE LAW 194–95 (Cambridge Univ. Press 1995).
154. See Nancy M. Steblay, A Meta-Analytic Review of the Weapon Focus Effect, 16
LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 413, 415–17 (1992).
155. See Loftus, supra note 134, at 8 (discussing study of more than jury-ser-
vice-eligible adults in Washington, D.C. area where “thirty-seven percent of the
respondents actually thought the presence of a weapon would make a witness’[s]
memory for event details more reliable, while thirty-three percent thought that the
presence of a weapon either would have no effect or were not sure of what effect a
weapon would have”).
156. See id. at 9 (noting that laypersons similarly assume that stress of event
may actually enhance accuracy).  Yet, studies confirm stress and violence as factors
that degrade eyewitness reliability. See Kenneth A. Deffenbacher et al., A Meta-Ana-
lytic Review of the Effects of High Stress on Eyewitness Memory, 28 LAW & HUM. BEHAV.
687, 687, 699 (2004); Charles A. Morgan III et al., Accuracy of Eyewitness Memory for
Persons Encountered During Exposure to Highly Intense Stress, 27 INT’L J. L. & PSYCH. 265
(2004).
157. Federal decisions include: United States v. Brownlee, 454 F.3d 131 (3d
Cir. 2006); United States v. Smithers, 212 F.3d 306 (6th Cir. 2000); United States v.
Kime, 99 F.3d 870 (8th Cir. 1996); United States v. Daniels, 64 F.3d 311 (7th Cir.
1995); United States v. Brien, 59 F.3d 274 (1st Cir. 1995); United States v. Rincon,
28 F.3d 921 (9th Cir. 1994); United States v. Harris, 995 F.2d 532 (4th Cir. 1993);
United States v. Curry, 977 F.2d 1042 (7th Cir. 1992); United States v. George, 975
F.2d 1431 (9th Cir. 1992); United States v. Moore, 786 F.2d 1308 (5th Cir. 1986);
United States v. Brown, 540 F.2d 1048 (10th Cir. 1976).
State courts admitting such evidence include: Ex parte Williams, 594 So. 2d
1225 (Ala. 1992); State v. Chapple, 660 P.2d 1208 (Ariz. 1983); Jones v. State, 862
S.W.2d 242 (Ark. 1993); People v. Campbell, 847 P.2d 228 (Colo. App. 1992); State
v. Kemp, 507 A.2d 1387 (Conn. 1986); McMullen v. State, 714 So. 2d 368, 370 (Fla.
1998); State v. Gaines, 926 P.2d 641 (Kan. 1996); Commonwealth v. Christie, 98
S.W.3d 485 (Ky. 2002); People v. Enis, 564 N.E.2d 1155 (Ill. 1990); Commonwealth
v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116 (Mass. 1997); White v. State, 926 P.2d 291 (Nev. 1996);
People v. LeGrand, 867 N.E.2d 374 (N.Y. 2007); State v. Gardiner, 636 A.2d 710
(R.I. 1994); State v. Whaley, 406 S.E.2d 369 (S.C. 1991); State v. Copeland, 226
24
Villanova Law Review, Vol. 58, Iss. 1 [2014], Art. 4
https://digitalcommons.law.villanova.edu/vlr/vol58/iss1/4
\\jciprod01\productn\V\VLR\58-1\VLR104.txt unknown Seq: 25 21-FEB-13 10:11
2013] ADMISSIBILITY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 93
those that bar it categorically.158  In jurisdictions which allow such testi-
mony, its admission (or exclusion) is governed by an “abuse of discretion”
standard, which often supports exclusion when there is some corroborat-
ing evidence of guilt.159  Beyond the discretion accorded to judges in de-
termining admissibility, it is simply prohibitive in terms of both cost and
witness availability to field experts in all or even most eyewitness identifica-
tion prosecutions,160 especially in light of the estimate of nearly 80,000
eyewitness-based prosecutions per year.161
Jury instructions also are not a uniform and potent compensatory
mechanism for the inadequacies of cross-examination and the persistent
phenomenon that “juries are generally unaware of [the] deficiencies in
human perception and memory . . . .”162  Again, not all states require such
instructions, and some bar them categorically as an improper comment on
evidence.163  In those federal and state courts that require an eyewitness
“cautionary” instruction, it is often generic, telling jurors nothing more
than “[t]estimony of witnesses as to identity must be received with caution
and scrutinized with care.”164  The instructions often have their genesis in
cases decided years or even decades before the explosion in eyewitness
S.W.3d 287 (Tenn. 2007); State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103 (Utah 2009). State v.
Percy, 595 A.2d 248 (Vt. 1990); State v. Moon, 726 P.2d 1263 (Wash. Ct. App.
1986); Engberg v. Meyer, 820 P.2d 70 (Wyo. 1991).
158. See, e.g., State v. Young, 35 So. 3d 1042, 1050 (La. 2010); Commonwealth
v. Simmons, 662 A.2d 621, 631 (Pa. 1995). But see Commonwealth v. Walker, 17
A.3d 921, 921 (Pa. 2011) (granting appeal on whether trial court had discretion to
permit petitioner to present “testimony of a nationally recognized expert in the
field of human memory, perception and recall where the sole evidence to establish
his guilt was the testimony of victim who was under extreme duress when assaulted
at gunpoint by a stranger of another race”).
159. See Jules Epstein, Expert Testimony: Legal Standards for Admissibility, in EX-
PERT TESTIMONY ON THE PSYCHOLOGY OF EYEWITNESS IDENTIFICATION 76–79 (Brian
Cutler ed., Oxford Univ. Press 2009).
160. See Roger C. Park, Eyewitness Identification: Expert Witnesses Are Not the Only
Solution, 2 LAW, PROBABILITY & RISK 305, 307 (2003); Christian Sheehan, Note,
Making the Jurors the “Experts”: The Case for Eyewitness Identification Jury Instructions, 52
B.C. L. REV. 651, 675 (2011).
161. Alvin G. Goldstein et al., Frequency of Eyewitness Identification in Criminal
Cases: A Survey of Prosecutors, 27 BULL. PSYCHONOMIC SOC’Y 71, 73 (1989).
162. Clopten, 223 P.3d at 1108.
163. See, e.g., Roberson v. State, 852 S.W.2d 508, 511 (Tex. Crim. App. 1993)
(“[A] charge on mistaken identity is an improper comment on the weight of the
evidence and should not be given.” (citation omitted)); Conley v. State 607 S.W.2d
328, 330 (Ark. 1980); Lewis v. State, 363 N.E.2d 1230, 1231 (Ind. 1977).
164. United States v. Angiulo, 897 F.2d 1169, 1205 n.19 (1st Cir. 1990) (quot-
ing United States v. Kavanagh, 572 F.2d 9, 11 (1st Cir. 1978)) (alteration in origi-
nal).  The much-heralded Telfaire instruction, cited by numerous courts as a model
offers little more. See United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d 552, 558 (D.C. Cir. 1972)
(telling jurors that identification must be proved beyond reasonable doubt, that
identification is dependent upon opportunity and capacity of witness to observe,
and without guidance asks jurors to be “satisfied that the identification made by
the witness subsequent to the offense was the product of [the witness’s] own recol-
lection”); see also Sheehan, supra note 160, at 673.
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psychology research.165  Finally, because some courts impose narrow trig-
gering conditions as a prerequisite, in many identification cases not even
the generic language will be proffered to the jury.  These circumstances,
without scientific foundation or validity, include “where no corroboration
of the testimony exists, or where the witness’[s] memory has faded by the
time of trial, or where there was a limited opportunity for observation.”166
This is not to say that no jury instruction is adequate, or that no court
gives focused and informative charges.167  A small but significant move-
ment in that direction is apparent, with the Hawaii168 and New Jersey169
Supreme Courts recently mandating the use of science-based, detailed in-
structions in eyewitness identification trials.  Yet the generic instructions so
165. Pennsylvania, for example, uses a jury instruction developed in the
1950s. See Commonwealth v. Ali, 10 A.3d 282, 303 (Pa. 2010) (affirming that cau-
tionary instruction to be provided in eyewitness cases is that found in Common-
wealth v. Kloiber, 106 A.2d 820 (Pa. 1954)).  The Kloiber instruction requires
caution only in cases of witness uncertainty or limited opportunity to observe, and
has no play when various estimator variables are present:
[W]here the witness is not in a position to clearly observe the assailant, or
he is not positive as to identity, or his positive statements as to identity are
weakened by qualification or by failure to identify defendant on one or
more prior occasions, the accuracy of the identification is so doubtful
that the Court should warn the jury that the testimony as to identity must
be received with caution.
Kloiber, 106 A.2d at 826–27.
166. Heath v. Hill, No. 07-669-TC, 2009 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 124624, at *32 (D.
Or. Nov. 17, 2009) (quotation and citation omitted).
167. See, e.g., United States v. Jones, 762 F. Supp. 2d 270, 278 n.5 (D. Mass.
2010) (detailing supplemental instruction provided at trial that emphasized
problems with cross-racial identification and potential degrading impact on eyewit-
ness reliability occasioned by stress of criminal act).
168. See State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1038–39 (Haw. 2012) (mandating
prospectively that “when eyewitness identification is central to the case, circuit
courts must give a specific jury instruction upon the request of the defendant to
focus the jury’s attention on the trustworthiness of the identification”).  The ap-
proved instruction includes some estimator variables, particularly stress and own-
race bias, and the Hawaii Court encouraged “modification of this instruction or
the development of other related instructions . . . [and referred] this instruction to
the Committee on Pattern Criminal Jury Instructions for future comments, sugges-
tions, and any recommended modifications.” Id. at 1039.
169. See State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 924 (N.J. 2011).  The New Jersey
Supreme Court held:
[E]nhanced instructions [must] be given to guide juries about the vari-
ous factors that may affect the reliability of an identification in a particu-
lar case.
Those instructions are to be included in the court’s comprehensive
jury charge at the close of evidence. In addition, instructions may be
given during trial if warranted.  For example, if evidence of heightened
stress emerges during important testimony, a party may ask the court to
instruct the jury midtrial about that variable and its effect on memory.
Id.  On July 19, 2012, the new eyewitness jury instructions were approved by the
New Jersey Supreme Court. See Press Release, New Jersey Courts, Eyewitness Iden-
tification Criteria for Criminal Cases (Jul. 19, 2012), available at http://www.judici-
ary.state.nj.us/pressrel/2012/jury_instruction.pdf.
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often used, and the risk that they can actually reinforce jurors’ mistaken
beliefs about eyewitness reliability,170 show that a blanket notion that hav-
ing some instruction provides a meaningful tool for the assessment of eye-
witness testimony is mistaken and contradicted by substantial research.171
Whatever reforms may be occurring in particular states, and however
effective these safeguards and improvements may be in a particular case,
as a system the adversary trial process offers no assurance that a factfinder
will be able to meaningfully assess the reliability of eyewitness testimony
and properly ensure against irreparable misidentifications, precisely be-
170. See, e.g., Commonwealth v. Santoli, 680 N.E.2d 1116, 1121 (Mass. 1997)
(changing state’s eyewitness instruction regarding witness’s confidence in identifi-
cation because “there is significant doubt about whether there is any correlation
between a witness’s confidence in her identification and the accuracy of her recol-
lection”); Sheehan, supra note 160, at 679 (“[I]nstructions can aggravate error by
reinforcing erroneous assumptions about eyewitnesses.”).
The risk of juror misdirection as a result of a-scientific jury instructions is
demonstrated in the Telfaire charge itself, which advises jurors that “you must con-
sider the credibility of each identification witness in the same way as any other
witness, consider whether he is truthful . . . .”  United States v. Telfaire, 469 F.2d
552, 559 (D.C. Cir. 1972).  Rarely is truthfulness a concern in an eyewitness case, as
the witness testifies without malice or corrupt motive; rather, the issue is that of an
honest mistake.  A jury instruction that redirects the focus to honesty obscures this
concern.
171. Devenport et al., supra note 147, at 63–64.  After surveying juror instruc-
tion efficacy research, the authors conclude:
[J]udicial cautionary instructions, in their present state, may be an inef-
fective safeguard against erroneous convictions resulting from mistaken
eyewitness identifications, and at best, their effectiveness is questiona-
ble . . . .  [R]esearch suggests that the cautionary instructions currently
relied on by the courts . . . either have no effect or enhance juror skepti-
cism rather than juror sensitization . . . .
Id.
Two additional concerns arise when analyzing jury instructions as a remedial
tool—timing and language.  Instructions at trial’s end have a diminished ability to
inform juror understanding and increase sensitivity. See Gabriella Ramirez et al.,
Judges’ Cautionary Instructions on Eyewitness Testimony, 14 AM. J. FORENSIC PSYCHOL.
31, 45 (1996).  The New Jersey Supreme Court seemingly recognized this when it
reminded judges of their discretion to give jury instructions “during trial if war-
ranted.” Henderson, 27 A.3d at 924 (“For example, if evidence of heightened stress
emerges during important testimony, a party may ask the court to instruct the jury
midtrial about that variable and its effect on memory.”).
The stilted language of many jury instructions is a compounding factor, limit-
ing comprehension and understanding even when the timing factor is not in play.
See American Law Institute, ABA Principles For Juries and Jury Trials, 2005 A.B.A. 753,
867–69 (discussing how pattern jury instructions are typically drawn from case law
or statutes that lay jurors are not familiar with and which they do not understand);
Molly Armour, Comment, Dazed and Confused: The Need for a Legislative Solution to the
Constitutional Problem of Juror Incomprehension, 17 TEMP. POL. & CIV. RTS. L. REV. 641,
642 (2008); J. Brittany Cross, Note, Juror Incomprehension: Advocating for a Holistic
Reform of Jury Instructions, 98 KY. L.J. 355 (2010); Denis J. Devine et al., Jury Decision
Making: 45 Years of Empirical Research on Deliberating Groups, 7 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y &
L. 622, 667 (2001) (“It is clear from 20 years of research that jurors have difficulty
wading through the technical jargon, convoluted logic, and stilted structure that
characterize many pattern instructions.”).
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cause of this wide variation in how identification cases are tried.  The
Court’s 1981 pronouncement that “[while] identification testimony is sig-
nificant evidence, such testimony is still only evidence[,]”172 one made
before the impact of both scientific research and compelling DNA exoner-
ations was felt, rings hollow and misses the more important question—is
this “only evidence,” or evidence that needs either greater screening
before its admission or admission conditioned upon ensuring that
factfinders have the tools to critically and reliably assess its value?  It is a
Due Process threshold cognizant of system deficiencies, proposed in the
next section of this Article, which may provide that capacity.
V. A “SLIDING SCALE” DUE PROCESS THRESHOLD
For more than a century, it has been clear that the mandates of Due
Process are variable, dependent upon the nature of the proceeding and
the particulars of the case.  In 1909 the Court noted, “[W]hat is due pro-
cess of law depends on circumstances.  It varies with the subject-matter and
the necessities of the situation.”173  If the “necessities of the situation” are
ensuring at least the possibility of an accurate determination of whether
the statement “that’s the person” is correct, then the variability must
account for the particular jurisdiction’s (or trial’s) available tools.  There-
fore, whether couched in terms of avoiding “irreparable misidentifica-
tion”174 (the specific language for eyewitness identification suppression
challenges) or the more generic Due Process right to confront and “ex-
plain” adverse evidence,175 the admissibility threshold should vary de-
pending upon the tolerance of expert evidence and the nature and
language of the approved jury instructions.
This conclusion follows from the inadequacies of the trial process de-
tailed in Section IV above176 and is compatible with the evidentiary relia-
172. Watkins v. Sowders, 449 U.S. 341, 348 (1981) (quoting Manson v.
Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 113 n.14 (1977)) (alteration in original).
173. Moyer v. Peabody, 212 U.S. 78, 84 (1909). See also Mathews v. Eldridge,
424 U.S. 319, 334 (1976) (“[D]ue process . . . is not a technical conception with a
fixed content unrelated to time, place and circumstances . . . [but] is flexible and
calls for such procedural protections as the particular situation demands.”) (cita-
tion and quotation omitted).
174. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.
175. For a discussion of the Due Process right to confront and “explain” ad-
verse evidence, see supra notes 105–20 and accompanying text.
176. The contrast with the admission of “shaky” expert testimony is informa-
tive.  The Daubert Court approved of a low admissibility threshold because of the
availability in the adversarial process of “contrary evidence,” i.e., a counter-expert.
For a further discussion of Daubert, see supra notes 116–19 and accompanying text.
Eyewitness cases typically lack that “contrary evidence,” as there is no category of
witness who can say “that identifying witness was wrong, and here’s why.”  The
eyewitness expert may list factors that call accuracy into question, but may not
directly refute the eyewitness’s testimony. See, e.g., United States v. Smithers, 212
F.3d 306, 317 n.3 (6th Cir. 2000) (“[N]o expert may testify as to what witness did
or did not see.”); Epstein, supra note 159, at 79–80.
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bility threshold intended by the Court in its seminal holdings from Stovall
through Manson and Biggers.177  The goal was the admission of evidence
subject to traditional trial safeguards, which would permit factfinders to
weigh identification evidence found evidentiarily “reliable” and make
sound determinations as to its accuracy.
What was unknown, and perhaps unknowable, when the initial Due
Process identification “reliability” standard was pronounced (1967-1976)
was the inability of those traditional mechanisms to work.  To the contrary,
state supreme courts did not begin to approve the use of expert testimony
until almost a decade later,178 jury instructions were generic and a-scien-
tific, the “explosion” in eyewitness research had barely commenced, and
the confirmation of juror error by DNA exonerations was unknown.
The incapacity of factfinders to prevent irreparable misidentifications
without appropriate screening tools is now manifest.  It is demonstrated
(over and beyond the DNA exonerations) by extensive research.  In one
reported study, researchers presented individuals with crime scenarios de-
rived from previous empirical studies.  The study’s participants estimated
an average accuracy rate of seventy-one percent for a highly unreliable
scenario in which only 12.5 percent of eyewitnesses had in fact made an
accurate identification.179  Rather than a truth-ascertaining process, the
eyewitness accuracy determination was a matter of chance absent some
particularly corroborating evidence or an especially strong opportunity to
observe and resulting reliable memory of the event.180  As one commenta-
177. For a further discussion of these seminal cases, see supra notes 34–60 and
accompanying text.
178. See People v. McDonald, 690 P.2d 709, 719–21 (Cal. 1984); State v. Chap-
ple, 660 P.2d 1208, 1218 (Ariz. 1983).
179. See John C. Brigham & Robert K. Bothwell, The Ability of Prospective Jurors
to Estimate the Accuracy of Eyewitness Identifications, 7 LAW & HUM. BEHAV. 19, 22-24
(1983).  This study was relied upon by the Hawaii Supreme Court in its 2012 deci-
sion mandating science-based jury instructions in eyewitness identification cases.
See State v. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d 1027, 1036 (Haw. 2012).
180. The term “chance” is not meant to convey the notion that every eyewit-
ness identification assessment by a jury is random in terms of accuracy.  Juror accu-
racy will vary depending upon the particular eyewitness, the circumstances of the
case, the presence of corroborating evidence, and the available (expert and jury
instruction) safeguards.  Rather, “chance” connotes a risk of guessing at eyewitness
accuracy, a phenomenon resulting from the lack of requisite knowledge as to how
to weigh eyewitness claims.  There is substantial support for the related proposi-
tion that eyewitnesses themselves “guess” at the right choice.  One commentator
has remarked on evidence of the possibility of increased other-race guessing in
cross-racial identifications. See James M. Doyle, The Other-Race Effect and Contempo-
rary Criminal Justice: Eyewitness Identification and Jury Decision Making, 7 PSYCH. PUB.
POL. AND L. 253, 254 (2001); see also Michael R. Leippe, The Case for Expert Testimony
About Eyewitness Memory, 1 PSYCHOL. PUB. POL’Y & L. 909, 909 (1995) (“A great
upsurge in eyewitness memory research began in the early 1970s, and much of this
research has revealed a disturbingly high error rate . . . .”); Jeffrey Philip Ouellet,
Note, Posado and the Polygraph: The Truth Behind Post-Daubert Deception Detection, 54
WASH & LEE L. REV. 769, 802 (1997) (“[R]esearchers consistently find a high level
of error in lay eyewitness identification testimony.”).  The risk of “chance” identifi-
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tor concluded upon reviewing ample research on this issue, “The key find-
ing in this body of research is that people do not perform well at
distinguishing between accurate and inaccurate identifications.”181
That something more than traditional trial tools—in particular some-
thing more than cross-examination and argument—is necessary to ensure
the possibility of accurate evaluation of eyewitness testimony is at the core
of the recent Hawaii and New Jersey Supreme Court decisions mandating
science-based jury instructions in identification-based prosecutions.  Al-
though not decreed as a requisite of Due Process jurisprudence, each
court made clear that without such information, the traditional trial pro-
cess made the risk of unreliable verdicts too great.  The New Jersey Court
stated this cogently as “the court’s obligation to help jurors evaluate evi-
dence critically and objectively to ensure a fair trial.”182  The Hawaii Court
expanded upon this, making clear the link between the now-mandatory
instructions and the need for some mechanism to permit a reliable
adjudication:
Cross-examination may not adequately apprise the jury of the fac-
tors it should consider in assessing the reliability of eyewitness
identification testimony or of the deficiencies of eyewitness iden-
tification testimony . . . .
Without appropriate instructions from the court, the jury
may be left without sufficient guidance on how to assess critical
testimony, sometimes the only testimony, that ties a defendant to
an offense.183
If the Hawaii and New Jersey Courts are correct that some essential infor-
mation must be provided to prevent irreparable mistaken identifications,
then in one sense the Due Process reliability threshold is easily ascer-
tained—it is the continued use of the low-level evidentiary test envisioned
cations is confirmed in studies using perpetrator-absent lineups, i.e., lineups where
witnesses view a group that does not include the actual doer.  The results often
show high percentages identifying a lineup participant as the criminal. See Gary L.
Wells, What Do We Know About Eyewitness Identification?, 48 AM. PSYCHOLOGIST 553,
560–61 (1993).  The risk of selecting an innocent person in a perpetrator-absent
lineup is exacerbated when the process is simultaneous (viewing all participants at
the same time) rather than sequential (viewing one lineup participant at a time).
See Nancy K. Steblay, Jennifer E. Dysart & Gary L. Wells, Seventy-Two Tests of the
Sequential Lineup Superiority Effect: A Meta-Analysis and Policy Discussion, 17 PSYCHOL.
PUB. POL’Y & L. 99, 100 (2011).  Yet all of the witnesses who “guessed” wrong may
be trial witnesses who jurors must assess the accuracy of.
181. SIMON, supra note 2, at 151.
182. State v. Henderson, 27 A.3d 872, 924 (N.J. 2011).  On July 19, 2012, the
new eyewitness jury instructions were approved by the New Jersey Supreme Court.
See New Jersey Courts, supra note 169.
183. Cabagbag, 277 P.3d at 1038.  The Hawaii Supreme Court did recognize
that the Perry decision seemed to link the jury instruction “safeguard” to a Due
Process guarantee, but did not describe its holding as constitutionally-mandated.
Id. at 1036.
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by the Court in Manson in trials where expert testimony is provided, scien-
tific principles and cautions are adduced through adequate instruction, or
both.184
However, where the trial structure does not ensure that jurors receive
sufficient information, through experts, jury instructions, or both, to be
able to “measure intelligently the weight of identification testimony that
has some questionable feature[,]”185 the compensatory measure must be
more stringent admissibility criteria for the challenged identification.  De-
fining these criteria are not easy, as they can only be whatever strictures
are necessary in a particular case to ensure that the ensuing assessment of
the identification involves more than guessing or chance and thus is not
likely to lead to an irreparable mistaken identification and resulting erro-
neous conviction.
In practice, what will this look like?  Consider two eyewitness scena-
rios, both in trials where expert testimony will not be available and the
jurisdiction either bans eyewitness jury instructions or uses ones which are
generic or fail to elucidate the relevant science.  In the first, the witness
and perpetrator are of the same race, and the variables that might call into
question the accuracy of the identification are ones easily grasped and
measured—a brief incident, poor lighting, and the intoxication of the
percipient witness.  In that scenario, Due Process is satisfied when the orig-
inal Manson evidentiary interest threshold is met.
In the second scenario, however, the potentially-degrading variables
are those found to be counter-intuitive or beyond general knowledge—
the witness and perpetrator are of different races, the presence of a
weapon and the resulting high stress, and the impact of post-identification
confirming feedback.186  Here, in deciding admissibility, the pre-trial
hearing judge must weigh how these factors increase the likelihood of an
irreparable mistaken identification, and determine whether there are suf-
ficient offsetting factors—for example, a lengthy and unobstructed oppor-
tunity to observe or a particularly detailed description including salient
features—to permit juror consideration of the identification evidence.
There will be no easy or quantifiable formula, but the qualitative assess-
ment will require judicial understanding of both the science of eyewitness
identification and the limits of lay factfinder awareness of the same, and a
consideration of whether the particular identification evidence can be
“measure[d] intelligently.”187
184. For a discussion the Manson evidentiary test, see supra notes 55–57 and
accompanying text.
185. Manson v. Brathwaite, 432 U.S. 98, 116 (1977).
186. See Henderson, 27 A.3d at 900 (explaining that “feedback affects the relia-
bility of an identification in that it can distort memory, create a false sense of confi-
dence, and alter a witness’[s] report of how he or she viewed an event”); see also C.
A. Elizabeth Luus & Gary L. Wells, The Malleability of Eyewitness Confidence: Co-Wit-
ness and Perseverance Effects, 79 J. APPL. PSYCHOL. 714, 717–18 (1994).
187. Manson, 432 U.S. at 116.
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That the proposed test is somewhat amorphous cannot be denied, but
it is no less so than the reliability determination itself, where a judge
weighs various factors to determine the identification’s independence—
whether the courtroom claim “that’s the guy” is a product of the witness’s
unadulterated memory rather than of the suggestive identification pro-
cess.188  It is akin to a Rule 403 analysis, where a judge has “[n]o mechani-
cal solution . . . [and] [t]he determination must be made whether the
danger of undue prejudice outweighs the probative value of the evidence
in view of the availability of other means of proof and other facts . . . .”189
VI. CONCLUSION
This Article addresses only a late stage in the eyewitness-based prose-
cution process—the adversary trial.  Given the number of variables—esti-
mator and system—that may have impacted and degraded the eyewitness’s
memory before trial, a remedy there may be “too little, too late,” and the
true remedial actions are those implemented at the investigation stage as
police gather and process identification evidence.  That this is occurring
cannot be denied and must be appreciated.  There has been impetus from
within the law enforcement community,190 as well as from legislatures191
and government agencies,192 to establish better practices, particularly in
witness interviewing and identification procedures.
188. For a delineation of the origins and current configuration of the weigh-
ing analysis for admitting eyewitness testimony following a suggestive identification
procedure, see supra notes 22–66 and accompanying text.
189. FED. R. EVID. 404 advisory committee’s note. See Old Chief v. United
States, 519 U.S. 172, 184–85 (1997) (“[J]udgment may be informed not only by
assessing an evidentiary item’s twin tendencies, but by placing the result of that
assessment alongside similar assessments of evidentiary alternatives.”); Douglas R.
Richmond, Regulating Expert Testimony, 62 MO. L. REV. 485, 523–24 (1997) (describ-
ing such weighing as “unremarkable” while nature of balancing “defies generaliza-
tion”).  Intriguingly, in Perry the Court acknowledged that Rule 403 may also be a
tool for excluding unreliable identification evidence, without noting that states are
not required to have such a rule in their evidence codes. See Perry v. New Hamp-
shire, 132 S. Ct. 716, 729 (2012).
190. See Mark Hansen, Show Me Your ID: Cops and Courts Update Their Thinking
on Using Eyewitnesses, 98 A.B.A.J. 18, 18 (2012).  Reforms include the issuance of
“model” policies by the International Association of Chiefs of Police and the Com-
mission on Accreditation for Law Enforcement Agencies. See Val Van Brocklin,
Defending Your Lineup In Court, OFFICER (July 18, 2011), http://www.officer.com/
article/10300765/defending-your-lineup-in-court.
191. Several states have laws mandating specific identification procedures, or
requiring police departments to develop such policies.  These include North Caro-
lina, Connecticut, Ohio, and Virginia. See Zinie Chen Sampson, Va. Police Required
to Have Eyewitness ID Policies, WASH. EXAMINER, July 5, 2012, http://washingtonex-
aminer.com/va-police-required-to-have-eyewitness-id-policies/article/feed/20091
42#.UHnAdPl24bs.  Texas passed legislation requiring police departments to
adopt their own policies or a “model” developed by the Law Enforcement Manage-
ment Institute of Texas. See TEX. CODE CRIM. PROC. ANN. art. 38.20 (West 2011).
192. See, e.g., Beth Schuster, Police Lineups: Making Eyewitness Identification More
Reliable, 258 NAT’L INST. JUST. J. 2 (2007), available at http://www.nij.gov/journals/
258/police-lineups.html; Vermont Department of Public Safety Law Enforcement
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Such changes, even if applied uniformly across the nation, cannot
prevent all erroneous convictions in eyewitness-based prosecutions, if only
because factors intrinsic to the crime—estimator variables—will continue
to result in degraded memory and mistaken identifications.  The New
Jersey Supreme Court recognized this in Henderson, finding essential the
remedy of science-based jury instructions in a state that for a decade has
enforced police best practices in eyewitness investigations.  Thus, trial
courts must continue to serve a gate-keeping function, and in the context
of identifications arising from a suggestive state-created process that vehi-
cle is the reliability determination initiated forty-plus years ago.
It is “imperative that the jury’s decisionmaking abilities are supported
by the best information available.”193  Where that imperative is not met
because of inadequate jury instructions, the absence of expert evidence, or
both, the gate-keeping function must be more stringent.  To that end, the
Due Process reliability assessment must be rethought to weigh the risk of
irreparable mistaken identifications in light of the deficiencies in
factfinder—juror—knowledge, and only those identifications that can be
intelligently weighed should be admitted.
Advisory Board, Summary Report 2011, 17, 18–31, available at http://www.leg.
state.vt.us/reports/2012ExternalReports/277888.pdf (proposing model eyewitness
policy for police departments); Letter from the Office of the Attorney General,
State of New Jersey, Attorney General Guidelines for Preparing and Conducting
Photo and Live Lineup Identification Procedures (Apr. 18, 2001), available at
http://www.state.nj.us/lps/dcj/agguide/photoid.pdf.
193. State v. Clopten, 223 P.3d 1103, 1118 (Utah 2009) (emphasizing that
cross-examination is inadequate tool in eyewitness cases).
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